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Introduction
Social Security has been a topic of widespread discus-
sion in the last decade. Rising longevity and fall-
ing fertility have led to an aging population, which 
increases solvency challenges for the Social Security 
system. Public concerns over low national saving 
have led to an extensive dialog on the merits of reform 
that might change the U.S. system into one with fully 
or partially funded personal accounts. Meanwhile, 
pensions in the private sector have been evolving from 
predominantly defined benefit (DB) to predominantly 
defined contribution (DC), raising concerns that 
workers preparing for retirement have more personal 
responsibility, with more complex financial challenges, 
than ever before.
The Office of Retirement and Disability Policy at 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) created the 
Retirement Research Consortium (RRC) in 1998 to 
encourage research on topics related to Social Security 
and the well-being of older Americans, and to foster 
communication between the academic and policy com-
munities—in particular, through an annual research 
conference in Washington, D.C.1 The Michigan 
Retirement Research Center (MRRC) has been part of 
that effort for more than a decade. This article surveys 
a selection of MRRC output2 and highlights principal 
themes in the Center’s ongoing research.
From its inception, many MRRC researchers have 
specialized in quantitative analysis using microeco-
nomic data. The single most important data set for 
this work is the University of Michigan’s Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), a panel survey representa-
tive of the U.S. population older than age 50, with 
complementary information on Social Security and 
pension benefits. (Primary support for the HRS comes 
from the National Institute of Aging; however, SSA 
provides important supplementary support. SSA also 
provides earnings histories of HRS respondents and 
spouses who consent.) MRRC and the HRS work 
closely together.
Many analyses of possible Social Security reforms 
and related policy issues begin with the so-called “life-
cycle model” of Nobel laureate Franco Modigliani 
(1986). It forms the conceptual framework underly-
ing most empirical studies, and much of the research 
reviewed in this paper employs the life-cycle model. 
As its name implies, the model follows household 
members through their life spans. A household starts 
with a young adult single or couple. Earnings tend to 
rise as one ages, until abruptly ending at retirement. 
The premise of the model is that a household’s desired 
lifetime consumption profile is likely to be relatively 
flat. A household should therefore save during its 
peak earning years to accumulate assets that will 
enable it to maintain its standard of living, that is to 
say its consumption, after retirement. Thus, the model 
indicates motives for saving. It posits for each house-
hold a criterion, or “utility function,” which measures 
the satisfaction derived from lifetime consumption. A 
household’s lifetime consumption aims to maximize 
this utility function, subject to its budget constraints. 
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The latter make a household’s consumption options 
conditional on its earnings. Generalizing the criterion 
to reflect a household’s valuation of leisure time, we 
can use the model to study choices of how much to 
work and when to retire. The attributes of the utility 
function will characterize a household’s tolerance for 
risk; hence, one can use the model to explain portfolio 
choices at different ages. In fact, the model can admit 
many details and complexities.
Social Security Reform
One of the topics of greatest interest to MRRC 
researchers in recent years has been possible reform of 
the Social Security system. There have been numerous 
proposals from a wide variety of sources. One promi-
nent example is the 2001 Presidential Commission 
report Strengthening Social Security and Creating 
Personal Wealth for All Americans.3
One strand of MRRC research considers basic 
theoretical differences among public pension systems. 
A number of reform proposals involve the establish-
ment of personal retirement accounts. Laitner (2002) 
examines the fundamental theoretical difference 
between a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) public pension 
system and a system with funded private accounts. A 
PAYGO system pays benefits to current retirees out 
of tax revenues from current workers. A system with 
funded private accounts would collect taxes from each 
current worker and later pay his or her retirement ben-
efits from the balance of the account (that is, from the 
worker’s own cumulative contribution) plus accrued 
interest. Either system will reduce private incentives to 
save because both provide retirement benefit payments 
that substitute for private life-cycle accumulations. 
In the case of a funded public system, the system’s 
private account balances tend to offset reductions in 
private saving, and Laitner shows the offset is one-for-
one in some cases. With a PAYGO system, however, 
there are no public-system account balances to offset 
reduced private saving, inhibiting potential national 
wealth. To switch from a PAYGO Social Security 
system to one with funded private accounts requires 
a funding mechanism. Laitner shows that borrowing 
money through an increase in the national debt can set 
up initial private account balances for older workers. 
Neither efficiency gains or losses, nor changes in 
general equilibrium prices, will necessarily follow. 
Nevertheless, such a transition does not improve 
national saving.
Smetters (2005) employs a more complicated model 
reflecting household choices about work hours and 
lifetime consumption, and shows that it is possible to 
design a changeover from a PAYGO to an account-
type Social Security system that leaves no household 
worse off and leaves some clearly better off (known 
to economists as a “Pareto improvement”). The study 
shows that the course of reform can be arranged to 
elicit larger and more efficient labor supplies during 
the transition. When Nishiyama and Smetters (2006, 
2007) elaborate the model to include earnings uncer-
tainty and mortality risk, however, the efficiency gains 
tend to disappear. The existing Social Security system 
has a progressive benefit structure, which provides 
risk sharing, especially for households with low earn-
ings. In the sophisticated model, switching one-half of 
Social Security taxes to personal accounts no longer 
yields overall efficiency gains. Net gains reappear only 
when benefits to low earners under the residual Social 
Security system are made considerably more progres-
sive than those of the current system.
A second strand of MRRC research simulates likely 
effects of specific elements from the Presidential 
Commission’s list of reforms. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2002, 2004) use HRS panel data to construct a 
life-cycle model of household behavior. The model 
assumes that households choose their lifetime con-
sumption and retirement age, with the latter perhaps 
preceded by an interval of part-time employment. 
Interpersonal differences in earning ability, impa-
tience, taste for leisure, and taste for part-time work 
constitute an important element of the model (see 
“Labor Supply Behavior” section). Households face 
constraints on their ability to borrow, in the sense that 
their net worth must always remain nonnegative.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2003) consider commis-
sion proposals to limit future benefit growth to price 
inflation, boost minimum benefits, reduce benefits 
for early retirement more rapidly than currently 
scheduled, increase benefits for surviving spouses in 
low-wage households, or reduce high-income bracket 
Social Security benefits. The first and third propos-
als could have fairly significant effects according to 
the simulations. Pegging benefit growth to inflation 
leads to substantial reductions in the purchasing 
power of benefits over time, causing postponement 
of retirement. The authors find that full-time work 
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among individuals aged 62 in 2075 would increase 
by about 7 percentage points relative to current law, 
which allows benefits to grow with wages. The third 
proposal, which directly penalizes early retirement, 
can increase labor supply 3–4 percentage points at 
age 65 in 2075. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005a) study 
a Commission proposal allowing Social Security 
participants to allocate 4 percentage points of their 
payroll tax to a personal account, with traditional 
Social Security benefits being reduced proportionately 
for those with personal accounts. The new accounts 
pay market interest rates, assumed in the simula-
tions to equal 4.3 percent above the rate of inflation. 
Beyond a poverty threshold, retirement funds from 
the personal account may be withdrawn as either 
a lump sum or an annuity. In this simulation, the 
percentage of men retiring at age 62 increases from 
33 percent to 42 percent. The high rate of return on the 
new accounts tends to increase resources available to 
households, facilitating earlier retirement. Although 
the new accounts reward households—especially 
those with higher earnings—with greater benefits for 
postponing retirement than the existing system, the 
rate-of-return effect predominates in the simulations.
A third strand of MRRC research investigates pos-
sible reforms not explicitly covered in the Presidential 
Commission report. Gramlich (2006) confronts sol-
vency problems of the current Social Security system, 
which the Board of Trustees (2007) estimated to be 
about 3.5 percent of future taxable payroll.4 Gramlich 
proposes a package of modest-scale changes. He cal-
culates that eliminating the taxable maximum on the 
payroll tax, immediately increasing the normal retire-
ment age for benefits by 1 year, and adopting price 
indexing for approximately a decade would eliminate 
Social Security’s solvency problems in perpetuity. 
Laitner and Silverman (2006) investigate a policy 
change affecting Social Security tax requirements 
and benefit calculations. Earnings beyond a preset 
age—for example, 54—would not be subject to the 
payroll tax nor would they be used in calculating the 
participant’s Social Security benefits. The payroll tax 
earlier in life would be slightly (less than 1 percent) 
higher, to make the proposed reform revenue neutral. 
The simulations suggest that men would extend their 
careers by about 1 year, on average, following the 
policy change. An individual retires when the after-tax 
value of wages falls short of the value of retirement 
leisure. Income and payroll taxes lower a household’s 
perceived reward for work. By eliminating the payroll 
tax late in life, the proposed reform reduces tax-
induced incentives to retire early. In the simulations, 
most participants value the chance to work longer and 
keep more of their compensation, and the economy 
benefits from additional income tax revenues stem-
ming from longer careers.
The research of James and Edwards (2005) on 
public pension reform in Chile provides interesting 
evidence corroborating the possibility of labor-supply 
increases among older men in response to lower tax 
rates. Although the effects of different aspects of Chil-
ean reform are difficult to separate, “restricted access 
to early pensions and the exemption of pensioners 
from the pension payroll tax appear to exert a power-
ful effect on labor force participation rates.”
Social Security Disability Insurance
The onset of disability can pose a significant threat 
to work and economic welfare. The United States has 
established a network of public and private programs 
to mitigate disability’s economic consequences. The 
two most important federal programs are Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI). MRRC disability research 
evaluates features of these programs and studies 
program interactions.
Unlike most European countries, the United States 
has no universal short-term disability program, and 
imposes a 5-month waiting period for DI benefits. This 
has raised concerns about the potential for substantial 
loss of income before benefit payments begin. Bound, 
Burkhauser, and Nichols (2003) trace sources and 
patterns of household income prior to and follow-
ing DI application. The average applicant’s monthly 
earnings decline significantly (from $1,575 to $248) in 
the months before application, but the monthly income 
of the applicant’s household drops much less in the 
months before and after application (from $3,254 to 
$2,455) and over the next 3 years—even for those 
denied benefits. A patchwork of temporary disability 
benefits such as workers’ compensation and employer 
pension benefits seems to offset declines in their own 
and their spouse’s earnings. In the longer run, most 
of these temporary sources of income are replaced by 
DI benefits. Although SSI applicants also experience 
declines in earnings, their household income holds up 
much better because, on average, earnings play a less 
important role for them (the average household income 
of SSI applicants is $1,530 per month, compared with 
$3,458 for DI applicants). However, income from Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and 
other welfare programs declined for SSI awardees.
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Mitchell and Phillips (2001, 2002) study potential 
economic consequences of increasing the early Social 
Security retirement age for workers with health limita-
tions. The 2001 study finds that in the HRS cohort of 
men and women aged 51–61, the majority is eligible 
to apply for DI, but some men, and 20 percent of 
women, are not. The main reason for ineligibility is 
having insufficient quarters of coverage to qualify for 
benefits. A disproportionate share of the uncovered 
population has a health problem and lower income or 
wealth. The 2002 paper uses the first four waves of 
the HRS to predict DI application and award patterns 
longitudinally. Those in poor health and with lower 
education and income are more likely to apply for DI, 
compared with those reporting no health problems 
and more assets. Few factors distinguish those who 
are awarded benefits from those who are not. Among 
initial applicants, middle earners are more likely to be 
awarded DI benefits, while high-earning respondents 
are less likely to receive initial awards. For reapplica-
tions and appeals, higher non–Social Security wealth 
is positively correlated with a secondary award.
Examining the impact of increasing the early retire-
ment age is important, and merits additional research. 
For example, Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidman 
(2004) run successive simulations using increasingly 
sophisticated methods, with somewhat different 
results. They simulate consequences of several policy 
changes—including increasing the minimum age for 
Social Security retirement benefits to 65—on employ-
ment and DI applications. They find that increasing the 
early retirement age would reduce exits from the work 
force at age 62 (currently around 60 percent) by nearly 
20 percent, with little change in DI applications.
Bound, Cullen, Nichols, and Schmidt (2004) 
evaluate the adequacy of the DI program to insure 
against income losses associated with disability onset. 
They argue that the empirical literature measures DI 
efficiency costs in terms of either caseload growth 
or reduced labor force attachment, without consider-
ing how these costs are related to societal gains from 
redistribution. To address this, they calculate the 
expected financial benefits and costs of an increase 
in DI payments. The total cost of providing an addi-
tional $1 of income to current DI recipients is $1.50, 
which the average worker should be willing to “pay.” 
The average implicit price of an additional dollar of 
insurance is much higher than $1.50 for more highly 
educated (higher wage) workers, so they would not 
willingly purchase additional insurance. Although the 
average implicit price is always such that typical work-
ers would purchase additional insurance, more highly 
educated workers never gain since they bear a dis-
proportionate share of the costs. This analysis starkly 
shows the political economy aspects of DI program 
growth—those who will gain and lose from the policy 
as well as the tradeoff between program inefficiencies 
and social gains from its distributional consequences.
Another aspect of MRRC analysis, which is more 
multidisciplinary in nature, focuses on the relation-
ship between poor health behaviors or specific medi-
cal conditions and disability. Richardson and others 
(2003) show that poor health behaviors at baseline, 
specifically smoking and a sedentary lifestyle, predict 
workforce disability (a health-related limitation or 
inability to perform work tasks) and workforce exits 
within the 6 years studied. Vijan and Langa (2003) and 
Vijan, Hayward, and Langa (2004) find strong correla-
tions among diabetes, health-related work limitations, 
and workforce exit. Wray (2003) finds that poor mental 
health is also a strong predictor of workforce exit.
Burkhauser and Cawley (2004) examine the impact 
of obesity, as measured by body mass index (BMI), 
and find evidence that obesity increases the probability 
of health-related work limitations. The same authors 
(2006, 2008) argue that BMI does not distinguish fat 
from fat-free mass such as muscle and bone. Using 
data from the National Health and Nutrition Exami-
nation Survey III, they show that the identification 
of individuals as obese, group rates of obesity, and 
correlations of obesity with social science outcomes 
are all sensitive to one’s measure of fatness. They 
find that total body fat is negatively correlated with 
employment for some groups and that fat-free mass 
is not significantly correlated with employment for 
any group, a difference obscured in previous research 
using only BMI. Burkhauser, Cawley, and Schmeiser 
(2008) apply a similar strategy to predict DI applica-
tion. They find that, for white men, BMI consistently 
predicts future DI application. For white women, 
almost all measures are consistently predictive. For 
black men, none predict application. For black women, 
waist circumference and waist-to-hip ratio are the 
only significant predictors of DI application. This 
variation across race and gender suggests that social 
science data sets should include alternative measures 
of fatness. These findings allow policymakers to better 
predict program application and enrollment and hence 
overall Social Security costs.
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Labor Supply Behavior
The age at which workers decide to retire will have 
an important bearing on labor supply and per capita 
national output in coming years. Certainly, changing 
trends in women’s labor force participation will have 
a profound impact. This is especially significant in an 
era of declining birth rates and increasing longevity.
For many years, the most common retirement 
age for males was 65, and the second most common 
was 62. Researchers could readily identify probable 
reasons: Because of inequitable actuarial adjustments 
embedded in both Social Security and many private 
DB pensions, the reward for working after becoming 
eligible for benefits declined. By working full time 
another year after reaching age 65 (or, in the case of 
pensions, after qualifying for normal retirement bene-
fits), one would continue to collect wages, but as much 
as 1 year’s worth of benefits could be lost. Because the 
system failed to adjust future benefits to compensate 
for any benefits lost while continuing to work, the net 
wage fell. Furthermore, workers were not allowed to 
collect private pensions while working on the same 
job, and many jobs had a mandatory retirement age. 
Analysts examined the impact of wages, the change 
in the present value of expected future Social Security 
and pension benefits, and other factors on retirement 
age and found that the net gain from continued work 
typically turned sharply negative at age 65.
However, the institutional backdrop for retirement 
choices has shifted dramatically in the last three 
decades. Changes to Social Security enacted in 1983 
established incremental increases in the full-benefit 
retirement age and gradually reduced penalties 
for earnings after retirement until the penalty was 
entirely eliminated in 2000. The Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1986 abolished mandatory 
retirement in most jobs. Evolution toward DC pension 
plans in the private sector tended to ensure, and to 
make transparent, financial advantages for postponing 
retirement. Recent data show that the “spike” in male 
retirements at age 65 has indeed greatly diminished 
as more men work longer. Nevertheless, a bunching 
of male retirements at age 62 is still quite evident—in 
fact it is now the most common retirement age—
and presents a puzzle, given the incentives to delay 
retirement.
MRRC research suggests a possible explanation 
for a continuing effect of institutions and policies 
on retirement choices. Social Security and pension 
benefit formulas include a “one-size-fits-all” actuarial 
adjustment that favors no retirement age over another. 
Yet, there may be major differences in individual 
preferences. For instance, some people are very patient 
while others are not. Economists measure this impa-
tience with the “subjective discount rate.” A household 
with a high subjective discount rate “discounts” the 
value of a future pleasure relative to that of a present 
pleasure. Allowing different degrees for impatience 
for different households, Gustman and Steinmeier 
(forthcoming) estimate that about 45 percent of 
married men have subjective discount rates above 
5 percent, and one-third have rates above 20 percent. 
The latter rates indicate very impatient individuals 
who will eschew delays in benefit receipt under almost 
all circumstances. For them, the Social Security early 
retirement age is a great temptation.
As an illustration, although the Social Security 
penalty for early retirement at age 62 relative to retire-
ment at 65 is now roughly actuarially fair, Gustman 
and Steinmeier (2005b) find that a policy changing 
the early retirement age to 64 would induce 5 percent 
of the older male population to delay retirement from 
62 to 64. In a second example, simulations find that 
changes in Social Security rules legislated in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and phased in between 1992 and 2004, 
increased labor force participation among married 
men aged 65–67 by almost 2 percentage points, raising 
full-time work for this age group by about 9 percent 
(Gustman and Steinmeier 2006). According to these 
calculations, changes from 1992 to 2004 in the Social 
Security normal retirement age, the earnings test, 
and the delayed retirement credit account for about 
one-sixth of the increase in labor force participation of 
married men aged 65–67 for 1998–2004. Preference 
heterogeneity within the population seemingly can 
make even subtle details of pension plan and Social 
Security rules quite important for private behavior.
Some MRRC research analyzes complex retire-
ment outcomes involving the flows between full-time 
work, partial retirement, and full retirement, including 
people who retire, resume working, and subsequently 
increase the amount they work. Maestas (2004, 2007) 
examines the extent to which reversals from less to 
more work are planned, are due to economic hardship, 
or are due to dissatisfaction with retirement. Using the 
HRS, Maestas finds that almost half of retirements 
include periods of part-time work or involve returns to 
more intensive work. The return to work (or “unretire-
ment”) rate is 24 percent within 5 years of the first 
retirement and 36 percent for those who retired at 
ages 51–52. For all but 9 percent of those who returned 
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to work, “unretirement” was expected. Maestas and 
Li (2007) expand this investigation to discern possible 
other reasons for postretirement return to work. They 
use a measure of psychological burnout and recovery 
to predict retirement and labor force reentry patterns. 
Among their findings are that burnout is not a factor 
among those who partially retire, and that burnout 
combined with health problems makes full retirement 
more likely.
Another aspect of MRRC research considers impli-
cations of changes in women’s labor force participa-
tion. As married women have chosen to work more 
outside the home, they have improved the solvency 
of the Social Security system by contributing payroll 
taxes (despite being eligible for spousal benefits with-
out contributing)—and they have, of course, greatly 
augmented the market economy’s labor force. Laitner, 
House, and Stolyarov (2005) and House, Laitner, and 
Stolyarov (2008) attempt to quantify the “net social” 
consequences of the changeover. If the value of house-
work is measured as “home production,” then the 
economy’s net gain from married women entering the 
labor force equals their new earnings minus sacrificed 
home production. One can divide the net gain into pri-
vate gain, which equals new after-tax earnings minus 
lost home production, and public gain, which equals 
new tax revenues. The authors focus on private gain. 
Standard national income and product accounts do not 
measure home production, as direct measures are not 
available. However, the authors develop an indirect 
measure based on the life-cycle model. They argue 
that the financial assets of a retired couple with given 
lifetime earnings should be lower if both spouses 
earned wages than if the husband alone accounted for 
all wages. The asset difference should equal the mar-
ket expenditures needed in dual-earner households to 
replace forgone home production of the wife. Calibrat-
ing parameters from HRS data, the authors find that 
the private gain from a married woman’s labor force 
participation is roughly 75 cents per dollar of female 
earnings. In other words, increases in married wom-
en’s labor force participation seem to have augmented 
the well-being of U.S. households quite substantially 
in recent years.
House, Laitner, and Stolyarov (2006) expand the 
basic life-cycle model to include household choices 
about married women’s labor force participation at 
different ages, household saving, and married men’s 
retirement behavior. The aim is to understand the 
motives for new behavioral patterns rather than 
just assessing their welfare consequences, so that 
simulations can more accurately predict policy out-
comes. Although the resulting model is complex, the 
authors provide preliminary calibrations. The paper 
shows that HRS data with linked lifetime Social Secu-
rity earnings records for both men and women provide 
a basis for estimating the model’s new coefficients. 
Because the life-cycle model has long been a basic 
tool for analyzing prospective Social Security reforms, 
continuous efforts to update the model are potentially 
very important.
Financial Investment for Retirement
MRRC research over the last several years has sought 
to better understand how households build up and 
draw down their retirement wealth in the face of risks 
and opportunities. Models tend to distinguish inves-
tors’ asset location decisions (whether to hold wealth 
directly or to have it managed by money managers, 
pension funds, or insurers) from asset allocation deci-
sions (whether to hold wealth in stocks, bonds, or other 
forms). Generally, researchers distinguish patterns 
of behavior during the work-life accumulation phase 
from those in the retirement payout phase. These 
investigations generate insights about life-cycle saving 
and investment patterns.
One focus of MRRC research is the influence 
of labor market conditions on preretirement plan-
ning. One example is risk of lost earnings. Younger 
employees are most vulnerable to sharp declines in 
anticipated earnings, especially job loss. Accord-
ing to McCarthy (2003), this risk induces workers to 
favor DC pensions early in life so as to diversify their 
retirement saving. As workers near retirement, they 
increasingly prefer DB pensions, which provide access 
to well-priced group annuities and allow diversifica-
tion of wealth outside financial markets. Horneff, 
Maurer, and Stamos (2006) also find that asset alloca-
tion decisions among the young are strongly shaped 
by earnings risk. Empirical research by Benitez-Silva 
(2003b) shows that labor market flexibility shapes 
investment preferences. He finds that those with more 
flexible jobs5 hold 12-14 percent more stock than those 
whose jobs tightly constrain them, suggesting that 
job flexibility acts as a kind of insurance that allows 
greater financial risk-taking. Another way in which 
earnings and investment decisions are intertwined 
involves the timing of retirement. Sevak (2002) finds 
that workers nearing retirement who experience unex-
pected increases in wealth retire earlier. Specifically, a 
$50,000 gain in retirement wealth (through successful 
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investments) leads to a 1.9 percentage point increase in 
retirement probability among workers aged 55 to 60.
Another set of studies has explored ways in which 
workers handle DC pension investments. Yamaguchi 
(2006), Yamaguchi, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus 
(2007), and Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi 
(2006) have built an extensive database of millions 
of 401(k) plan participants to assess trading and 
investment patterns. The research shows that about 
80 percent of participants fixed their initial contribu-
tion allocation and never revisited the decision over a 
2-year period between 2003 and 2004. This is strik-
ing because financial market shifts can make pension 
accumulations diverge dramatically from initial inten-
tions. The analysis also finds that portfolio trading 
is more frequent if employers put more funds in the 
plan menu, if participants invest in company stock, 
and if workers have internet access to their portfolio. 
One particularly interesting finding is that traders’ 
risk-adjusted returns prove to be the same as those 
of nontraders overall, though passive rebalancers—
who hold only life-cycle or balanced funds—earn 
the highest risk-adjusted returns. Dominitz and Hung 
(2006) find that employees who are offered lifestyle 
and life-cycle funds in their pension menus can wind 
up better off; although it does tend to be conservative, 
life-cycle investing may induce some investors to take 
on more risk than they otherwise would, and to invest 
more efficiently than if relying on their own strategies. 
Interestingly, van Soest and Kapteyn (2006) show that 
people who expect higher Social Security benefits 
view those benefits as a safe buffer that makes the risk 
of investing in other retirement resources more accept-
able. These findings seem to contradict the notion that 
high Social Security benefits have a negative effect on 
private retirement investment. Instead, Social Secu-
rity benefits exert positive effects on several forms of 
wealth accumulation.
The possibility of outliving one’s assets is perhaps 
the most prominent risk affecting retirees. Work by 
Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2006, 2008), 
Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2007), and 
Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell (2005) examines older 
women’s decisions of whether (and when) to buy annu-
ities or to hold financial-market assets. The appeal 
of an annuity is that it provides longevity insurance, 
so that the retiree will not outlive her wealth. On the 
other hand, turning funds over to an insurer precludes 
leaving an estate for one’s heirs. The research shows 
that the optimal strategy involves holding some stock 
and gradually annuitizing over the retirement period. 
This gives the retiree access to both the survival insur-
ance of annuities and the equity premium from stocks. 
The research also shows that the phased withdrawal 
rule encouraged under U.S. tax law can appeal to a 
wide range of retirees. Complementing this work, 
Benitez-Silva (2003a) suggests that Social Security 
benefits, paid as a lifelong annuity, play an important 
role in retiree asset location decisions.
Some recent MRRC research on retirement accu-
mulation and decumulation turns to the question 
of how people actually make financial decisions—
whether they are financially literate, whether they 
carefully plan, and whether they execute their plans 
successfully. Lillard and Willis (2001) focus on differ-
ences in consumer competence at older ages to make 
complex investment and saving decisions. The authors 
find that low cognitive capacity6 is a significant imped-
iment to good financial decisionmaking. Expanding 
on this topic, Kezdi and Willis (2003) examine how 
cognitive capacity and other factors shape people’s 
perceptions of investment options, and show strong 
effects of cognitive capacity and optimistic expecta-
tions on the probability of holding stocks. Delavande, 
Rohwedder, and Willis (2008) propose thinking about 
financial literacy as a cognitive capacity, a part of 
human capital in which people can invest. In deciding 
whether to invest in acquiring financial knowledge, 
the effort is balanced against the expected return. For 
older people, the potential reward may not seem worth 
the effort.
Financial literacy in retirement planning is the 
focus of a number of MRRC studies (Lusardi 2003, 
2006; Lusardi and Beeler 2007; Lusardi and Mitchell 
2005, 2007a, 2007c). Lusardi (2003) finds that strik-
ingly few HRS respondents can correctly answer 
simple questions about inflation, interest compound-
ing, and risk diversification. Women and racial/ethnic 
minorities display particular deficits of financial 
knowledge. People who are more financially literate 
are more likely to plan for retirement and execute their 
financial plans successfully. The availability of profes-
sional financial services does not seem to eliminate the 
need for individual literacy.
More recent work stresses the accumulation 
phase of the life cycle. Using data from the RAND 
American Life Panel, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) 
evaluate financial knowledge during workers’ prime 
earning years (most of the sample is aged 40–60), 
when important financial decisions are made. With 
more detailed measures of financial literacy than were 
available in earlier studies, the authors show that by 
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every measure, financial literacy proves to be a strong 
predictor of financial planning for retirement.
Well-being in Retirement
A significant share of MRRC work deals with factors 
affecting retirement savings and material well-being 
in retirement. In this context, important questions of 
how to measure well-being arise. For example, policy-
makers have long relied on income-based measures of 
poverty. Hurd and Rohwedder (2006) compare these 
with a consumption-based measure. They use data 
from the Consumptions and Activities Mail Survey 
(CAMS), which they developed. Consumption is 
arguably a much more accurate measure of material 
well-being than income, because those in retire-
ment are able to spend out of their savings. Hurd and 
Rohwedder find that consumption-based poverty rates 
are considerably lower than income-based rates. The 
differences are especially dramatic for singles. For 
example, among 55- to 59-year-old singles, the poverty 
rate based on after-tax income is around 20 percent, 
but it is only 10 percent when a consumption-based 
measure is used.
It is well-documented that household expenditures 
over the life cycle increase through middle age and 
decline sharply thereafter. Household consumption 
tends to rise from ages 25 to 45 and to fall between 
ages 45 and 70. Some research finds a distinct drop 
in spending at retirement. This finding is somewhat 
at odds with the life-cycle model, which posits that 
households should seek to smooth consumption—to 
acquire and maintain a given standard of living—over 
the life cycle. Using the CAMS, Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2005) examine this so-called “retirement consump-
tion puzzle.” They find that declines in spending after 
retirement often appear to have been anticipated. A 
closer examination shows that 37 percent of house-
holds report no change in spending at retirement, 
11 percent report spending increases, 20 percent 
report declines of 20 percent or less, and 30 percent 
report declines exceeding 20 percent. A detailed look 
at the last group reveals that they are more likely 
to have experienced deteriorating health (see also 
Rohwedder 2006).
Aguiar and Hurst (2008) use data from the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey to analyze categories of 
spending as well as time allocation over the life cycle. 
They find that the entire decline in nondurable expen-
ditures later in life is attributable to three categories—
food, nondurable transportation, and clothing/personal 
care—which are all positively correlated with gainful 
employment. Food expenditures are amenable to home 
production, while transportation and clothing are pri-
marily workers’ expenses. The remaining nondurable 
categories, constituting roughly half of total nondu-
rable expenditures, do not decline at older ages. These 
categories include entertainment, housing services, 
charitable giving, and utilities. Moreover, expenditures 
on several of these categories, most notably enter-
tainment, actually increase over the latter half of the 
life cycle.
Other MRRC research addresses different factors 
that influence retirement well-being. Rohwedder and 
van Soest (2006) use HRS data to examine the impact 
of misperceptions about Social Security benefits. 
Comparing expected benefits with those actually 
received, the authors demonstrate that people who 
overestimate their Social Security benefits tend to 
be among the least prepared when they retire. These 
people tend to reduce consumption at retirement 
more than those who underestimated or correctly 
estimated their benefits. Once retired, they have more 
worries about how to get by with the resources they 
have. They also more often report that retirement 
years turned out worse than expected. Such outcomes 
seem more pronounced for respondents who claimed 
benefits earlier than anticipated, relative to those who 
were simply misinformed.
Scholz and Seshadri (2007) examine the effects of 
children on household net worth. They find that the 
presence of children is important in explaining why 
wealth distribution is far more dispersed than earnings 
distribution. Because children require a portion of 
household resources, retirees with children may have 
a lower living standard to maintain than those with no 
children. Their share of household resources has been 
less at all ages.
Another set of MRRC papers directly addresses the 
question of resource adequacy in retirement. Using 
data from the CAMS, Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) 
find that a substantial majority of those aged 66–69 
are adequately prepared for retirement in that they will 
be able to follow a path of consumption that begins 
at their current level and subsequently follows an age 
pattern similar to the average for current retirees. 
They do not find inadequate preparation for retirement 
on average or at the median. However, they also find 
that many singles lacking a high school education 
are forced to reduce consumption: Almost half could 
reduce initial consumption by 15 percent and still 
face a greater than 5 percent chance of outliving their 
wealth. The authors find that retirement preparation 
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among couples is much better. However, a noteworthy 
subgroup is college graduates: When taxes are taken 
into account, the proportion that is adequately pre-
pared falls by about 18 percentage points.
Scholz and Seshadri (2008) use HRS data to assess 
the degree to which individuals born before 1954 have 
accumulated or are accumulating the wealth neces-
sary to maintain preretirement living standards in 
retirement. They show that only 3.6 percent of HRS 
households have net worth below optimal targets, and 
among those, the shortfall is small. There is some evi-
dence that younger subgroups are less likely to meet 
targets; but even in the 1948–1953 birth year cohort 
only 10.2 percent of households are below target, and 
the median shortfall is $16,306. These findings suggest 
that households overall are not making large, system-
atic errors in their financial preparation for retirement.
Dushi and Honig (2007) investigate specific sources 
of retirement wealth. They report on HRS data com-
paring 401(k) plan participation rates for cohorts born 
1931–1941 with those born 1948–1953. Participation 
for the younger cohort is nearly 50 percent greater. 
The substantial growth in participation over a rela-
tively brief period may reflect a growing interest in 
this particular saving vehicle, changes over this period 
in the external environment (such as the overall shift 
from DB to DC plans), or both influences.
With much attention currently focused on the hous-
ing market, MRRC is investigating housing equity 
as a potentially significant resource for older people. 
Walker (2004) uses the HRS to study how often older 
individuals draw down their housing equity to finance 
retirement expenses. She finds that most continue to 
own their homes until advanced ages. An interest-
ing question is whether this pattern will change in 
the future.
Distributional Effects
MRRC researchers are keenly interested in distribu-
tional aspects of policy and the extent to which public 
programs may mitigate potentially negative conse-
quences of income and wealth inequality.
In one of the earliest MRRC projects, Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2000) examine the distributional effects of 
the Social Security system in practice using the HRS 
cohort born 1931–1941. The formula for Social Secu-
rity benefits is progressive, offering proportionately 
higher returns to lower lifetime earners. At the fam-
ily level, however, spousal benefits alter this pattern. 
Generally, a retired couple can claim either the sum 
of the Social Security benefits for each spouse, or 
150 percent of the higher of the two benefits. Upon 
widowhood, the survivor can claim the higher of the 
spouses’ individual benefits. For HRS families in 
which the wife had little or no earnings history, the 
spousal benefit represented a bigger net gain than for 
families in which the wife had a substantial history 
of labor force participation. To the extent that wives 
of high-earning men in the HRS tended to have less 
labor force participation, their families’ gain from the 
spousal formula was especially large. This tended, 
in practice, to partially offset the progressivity of the 
benefit formula for individuals. Indeed, Gustman and 
Steinmeier find that redistribution from the Social 
Security system among HRS families is substantially 
lower than redistribution among individuals.
More recently, Stevens (2008) finds that reduced 
earnings growth rates over several decades, particu-
larly at the bottom of the earnings distribution, have 
produced greater wealth inequality for those in and 
nearing retirement. Stevens’ measure of household 
wealth includes capitalized pensions and Social Secu-
rity benefits. Changes in the lower half of the male 
earnings distribution explain a substantial portion of 
the growing inequality in the distribution of preretire-
ment wealth. Growth in women’s earnings does not 
offset declines associated with male earnings. The 
declining value of private employer-provided pensions 
is an important factor. In contrast, Social Security 
benefits have not been eroding, even for groups that 
have faced significant deterioration in real earnings. In 
fact, the role of Social Security for the latter groups is 
larger than for earlier cohorts.
Another set of papers examines an especially 
vulnerable population: widowed and divorced women 
(McGarry and Schoeni 2005; Haider, Jacknowitz, and 
Schoeni 2003; Weir and Willis 2003; Weir, Willis, 
and Sevak 2002). For example, the latter two studies 
show that widowhood is a key risk factor for transition 
into poverty for women. However, women older than 
age 65 are less likely to experience severe economic 
changes than women younger than age 61. Several 
factors account for age differences: the declining 
importance of husbands’ earnings with age, the ris-
ing importance of Social Security benefits, and the 
occasionally large out-of-pocket medical expenses 
associated with husbands’ death before Medicare eligi-
bility. McGarry and Schoeni examine the importance 
of medical expenses after Medicare eligibility. They 
show that, despite the success of Medicare in reducing 
out-of-pocket medical costs for the elderly, significant 
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gaps remain. Out-of-pocket spending to assist a dying 
spouse is a significant determinant of poverty rates 
for survivors. This circumstance disproportionately 
affects women and diminishes widows’ financial 
resources.
Conclusion
To summarize, themes of MRRC research include:
Developing a dynamic model of household behav-1. 
ior to estimate and simulate the effects of actual 
and proposed policy changes. The HRS, with its 
rich supply of socioeconomic information including 
linked Social Security lifetime earnings records, 
is a premier data resource for the estimation step. 
MRRC researchers have been pioneers in devel-
oping and using these data. The life-cycle model 
provides a theoretical framework to identify and 
describe behavioral motives and criteria. It there-
fore enables analysts to predict effects of policy 
reforms never previously implemented, make 
microeconomic calculations of welfare gains from 
policy and other changes, and understand and 
anticipate simultaneous household consumption/
saving, labor supply, and asset-allocation reactions 
to external changes.
Studying program policy interactions. 2. Changes in 
one public program (for example, increasing the 
age for full Social Security retirement benefits) 
may affect utilization and budgets of other public 
programs such as DI and SSI, and may also influ-
ence private behavior.
Promoting household welfare as the ultimate 3. 
concern of public policy. Accurate measurement 
of the well-being of the older population, for 
example, requires analysis of their time-allocation 
and consumption possibilities rather than merely 
their income or wealth. As another example, Social 
Security and other public programs have important 
redistributive components—and in studying pos-
sible reforms, one should seek to quantify welfare 
gains and losses, including potential diminution of 
the power of existing insurance-providing mecha-
nisms, as opposed to merely measuring effects on 
aggregate saving, income, or labor supply.
Using a research framework that is rich enough, 4. 
and flexible enough, to encompass large-scale 
trends. For example, longevity is increasing, 
private pensions are switching from DB to DC, 
and women’s labor force participation is rising. A 
dynamic model of household behavior can help 
policymakers to understand the consequences of 
such changes and contribute to the optimal design 
of public programs.
Mitigating the shortage of financial literacy. 5. Empir-
ical evidence seems to point to substantial diversity 
of financial knowledge. Those with less sophistica-
tion are increasingly vulnerable as the range and 
complexity of financial decisions facing Americans 
is now greater than ever. Policy remedies such 
as minimum Social Security benefit guarantees, 
sensible default settings in private pensions, and 
financial literacy education may be more important 
in practice than basic economic models predict.
Notes
1 An article in the October 2006 MRRC Quarterly 
Newsletter covers the history of the RRC, including Steven 
Sandell’s founding role. October Newsletter issues also 
review the most recent RRC Washington conference. See 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/newsletters/.
2 To date, the MRRC has issued over 200 working papers 
and policy briefs. See http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/ 
publications/papers/ and http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/
publications/policy/, respectively.
3 See http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/csss/reports/ 
Final_report.pdf
4 The 3.5 percent figure arises from infinite-horizon 
Social Security system deficit calculations.
5 Indicators of flexibility include self-employed status 
and ability to change hours worked or to work a second job.
6 As determined by age and education.
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